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with a space and an identity for their work in the movement (122). 
Although some women, like Guida Diehl, gained positions of promi-
nence, they were relegated to the margins of the church's activities. 
Among the more outrageous efforts of the German Christians were 
the attempts to dejudaize Christianity. When the Nuremberg Laws 
were promulgated in 1935, the German Christians responded with 
their own anti-Semitic rhetoric. They preached the wholly fallacious 
doctrine that Jesus was not a Jew and the gospel's message was hatred 
towards Jews. In 1939 they founded the Institute for Research into and 
Elimination of Jewish Influence in German Church Life. In March 
1939 representatives of eleven regional churches issued the Godesberg 
Declaration, which promoted the view that the Christian faith is "the 
unbridgeable religious opposite of Judaism" (149). Thus directly and 
indirectly the German Christian movement underwrote and even pro-
moted Nazi policies designed to destroy the Jews. 
B. is to be congratulated for this scholarly, well-balanced account of 
the German Christian movement, which comes as a welcome addition 
to studies dealing with the Holocaust. 
Loyola Marymount University, L.A. RICHARD W. ROLFS, S.J. 
DIVINE EMPATHY: A THEOLOGY OF GOD. By Edward Farley. Minne-
apolis: Fortress, 1996. Pp. xvi + 320. 
In keeping with his earlier theological works, Farley's latest book 
tackles a classical theological discussion in idiosyncratic and revision-
ist manner. This work, inevitably to be accounted F.'s "magnum opus," 
takes up the challenge of a theology of God starting from the "facticity 
of redemption." In F.'s view, the five ways in which the question of God 
is typically posed (through the retrieval of tradition, historical-cultural 
analysis, "world-puzzlement," praxis, and fundamental ontology) are 
all dependent on the prior experience of "the redemptive coming-forth 
of God as God" (21). Hence F. believes it is here that the theology of God 
should begin. 
His project proceeds in three phases. In the first, F. conducts a dia-
logue with both the classical Catholic theology of God and various 
forms of anti-theism. The second phase essays a way of speaking about 
God, a "symbolics" in F.'s terminology, that respects the fact that 
knowing God in God's "redemptive coming forth" is not knowing God as 
an object, being, or entity of which attributes can simply be predicated. 
The third and lengthiest task is the attempt to say how God and the 
world are related, or, in F.'s terms, how God acts in the world. F.'s 
conclusion is that the divine creativity and the redemptive activity of 
God in the world are both to be understood as empathetic, i.e., as 
oriented to "the promotion of the reality, freedom and cooperative in-
terrelation of entities" (303). The event of Jesus Christ is for Christians 
the specific location or "through-which" of this facticity of redemption. 
As the tripartite division of the text suggests, F.'s manner of pro-
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ceeding is by way of a phenomenology of the experience of God's re-
demptive activity. In the individual's experience of emancipation from 
the chains of various idolatries, redemption in fact occurs. God is not 
known directly in this experience, since God is not the kind of reality 
that human beings can know directly, but God "comes forth" in this 
event of emancipation as the "only thing that could found the being of 
the human being so as to break the hold of idolatry" (72). Structurally, 
this is not unlike the method of a cosmological argument; isolate the 
redemptive/creative activity at work in the world, and "this we call 
God." But as F.'s text unfolds, there seems to be more in common with 
Schleiermacher than with Aquinas. The experience of God's redemp-
tive activity occurs in a way not at all dissimilar from that in which 
analysis of the feeling of absolute dependence initiates the logic of the 
Glaubenslehre. This may leave some readers dissatisfied, since naming 
the power that makes emancipation possible is not quite the same 
thing as showing the necessity of God, any more than a "feeling of 
absolute dependence" is itself proof of the existence of any entity upon 
which this feeling rests. But then, for F., the moment of classical the-
ism is past. 
F.'s establishment of a theological middle ground between classical 
approaches and their radically postmodern critiques is most evident in 
his second section, where he structures a "symbolics of God." F. agrees 
with the classical attribute tradition that we can indeed say some 
things about God, but is persuaded by the anti-attribute opponents 
that this cannot be done by way of ontotheology. Attention must be to 
the "facticity of redemption." Stepping away from the "way of emi-
nence" of classical ontotheology, F. argues that what can be said about 
God symbolically ("ciphers" is his preferred term) emerges through 
reflection on what God must be like to be the agent of redemption. In 
other words, F. replaces the traditional conviction that through rev-
elation God is known as redeemer by the significantly different pro-
posal that it is through redemption that God is revealed. But the pro-
cess has a comfortingly familiar outcome, as it leads to the identifica-
tion of "three inclusive names for God: Redeemer (or Spirit), Creativity 
and the Holy" (124). Indeed, it is generally true of this work that 
despite the methodological radicalism, the content of Christian faith is 
largely left unchanged. 
If it is true that the God of F.'s book is the God of the Christian 
tradition, this should not lead to undervaluing the work's novelty and 
force. Those who in the past have found F.'s work difficult to read have 
done so, I believe, because of the way in which his extraordinary dis-
cernment and intelligence leads him into the practice of constant quali-
fication. In this present book that stylistic foible becomes a positive 
strength. As he turns away from one well-trod theological avenue after 
another, F. is clearly engaged in a species of negative theology. But 
where scriptural authority and ontotheological positivism are denied, 
his redescription of the facticity of redemption allows something alto-
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gether less tangible to return. Those committed to one or other house 
of authority will be uncomfortable with the process and the conclu-
sions. For the rest of us, F.'s work suggests not only how unnecessary 
those authorities are, but how without them God emerges in the ex-
perience of redemption—at once both less surely known and yet more 
reassuringly encountered. 
Fairfield University, Connecticut PAUL LAKELAND 
DIVINE DISCOURSE: PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE CLAIM THAT 
GOD SPEAKS. By Nicholas Wolterstorff. New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity, 1995. Pp. x + 326. $59.95; $18.95. 
In this fine work, based on the Wilde Lectures delivered at Oxford in 
1993, Wolterstorff offers a comprehensive examination of the philo-
sophical issues related to the religious claim that God speaks. He dis-
cusses in succession the declaration that God speaks, the interpreta-
tion of texts believed to be God's speech, and the justification for be-
lieving that God speaks. 
W.'s brief is simple: divine discourse, commonplace as it is taken to 
be by the world's major religions, receives very little philosophical 
attention. This is so because, while many theologians have discussed 
the importance of the Word of God, few have examined issues of prin-
cipal interest to a philosopher. More importantly, divine speech has too 
often been reduced to the more comprehensive term, revelation. W. 
argues, however, that divine discourse is unique and must be taken on 
its own terms. In light of this assertion, he proceeds to examine the 
claim that God speaks with reference to contemporary philosophical 
and hermeneutical issues. 
The first part, which is the strongest, constitutes a careful analysis 
of both the natural act of speaking and the predication of speech to 
God. W. adduces Austin's familiar distinction between locutionary acts 
(uttering sounds or writing words) and illocutionary acts (declaring, 
promising, commanding, etc.) as the fulcrum for his argument. In cer-
tain routine cases of double agency, one person performs locutionary 
actions while another performs illocutionary ones. This is the case, e.g., 
when an ambassador is deputized to represent the head of state or 
when a trusted aide assumes the voice of a government official. In each 
case, the former actually speaks but the latter's intentions are ex-
pressed. In a similar way, God appropriates human discourse in order 
to speak. Particular agents represent him in the biblical testaments, 
agents through whom God performs illocutionary acts. A constant in-
terlocutor here is Barth who resists conceding that human speech may 
be appropriated for divine discourse. For Barth, the dictum that God 
and God alone speaks for God does not allow for this kind of attribu-
tion. W. argues, however, that his own theory in no way compromises 
the divine sovereignty and freedom that Barth is determined to pro-
tect. 
